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QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
The following question is presented on appeal, together with those subsidiary 
questions fairly included therein, pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 49(a)(4): 
1. Whether the court of appeals erred in its determination of what constitutes 
an appearance for purposes of rule 5(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
REFERENCE TO REPORTED DECISION 
OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The court of appeals' decision was reported as Arbogast Family Trust v. River 
Crossings, LLC, 2008 UT App 277, 191 P.3d 39. A copy is attached hereto. 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(a) and (5) and 
Utah R. App. P. 45 because this is a review of a decision of the court of appeals pursuant 
to the Court's Order dated November 20, 2008 granting River Crossing's Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari on the above stated issue. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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CONTROLLING PROVISIONS 
URCP 5. Service and filing of pleadings and other papers. 
(a) Service: When required. 
(a)(1) Except as otherwise provided in these rules or as otherwise directed by the 
court, every judgment, every order required by its terms to be served, every pleading 
subsequent to the original complaint, every paper relating to discovery, every written 
motion other than one heard ex parte, and every written notice, appearance, demand, 
offer of judgment, and similar paper shall be served upon each of the parties. 
(a)(2) No service need be made on parties in default except that: 
(a)(2)(A) a party in default shall be served as ordered by the court; 
(a)(2)(B) a party in default for any reason other than for failure to appear shall be 
served with all pleadings and papers; 
(a)(2)(C) a party in default for any reason shall be served with notice of any hearing 
necessary to determine the amount of damages to be entered against the defaulting party; 
(a)(2)(D) a party in default for any reason shall be served with notice of entry of 
judgment under Rule 58A(d); and 
(a)(2)(E) pleadings asserting new or additional claims for relief against a party in 
default for any reason shall be served in the manner provided for service of summons in 
Rule 4. 
(a)(3) In an action begun by seizure of property, in which no person is named as 
defendant, any service required to be made prior to the filing of an answer, claim or 
appearance shall be made upon the person having custody or possession of the property at 
the time of its seizure. 
2 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal concerns the definition of what constitutes an "appearance" under 
Rule 5(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Virtually all of the federal courts to have 
considered this issue have adopted the position that an "appearance" under the federal 
counterpart to Rule 5(a) merely requires an indication of a "clear purpose to defend the 
suit". See e ^ , New York v. Green, 420 F.3d 99, 105 (2d Cir. 2005). Only one circuit 
has deviated from the general rule, mandating a much more rigorous standard that only 
the filing of a formal pleading before the trial court can constitute an appearance under 
Rule 5(a). See, e.g., Zuelzke Tool & Eng'g Co. v. Anderson Die Castings, Inc., 925 F.2d 
226, 230 (7th Cir. 1991). 
In its decision below, the court of appeals acknowledged that "the supreme court 
has never explicitly addressed the two competing lines of authority or defined what 
constitutes an appearance under rule 5." Arbogast Family Trust v. River Crossings, LLC, 
2008 UT App 277 f 22. Nevertheless, the court of appeals relied on two decisions of this 
Court, which it inconsistently stated had "interpreted rule 5 and addressed what 
constitutes an appearance," in embracing the minority view. Id. [^14. In fact, neither of 
these decisions directly addressed the issue now before the Court and neither decision 
mandated adoption of a minority position that runs directly counter to the oft-repeated 
public policy disfavoring default judgments and disposition of cases on procedural 
technicalities. See Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, Inc., 
544 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1975). 
3 
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Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented for Review 
Arbogast Family Trust (Arbogast) provided River Crossings a $2,450,000 loan. 
The loan was to be repaid with interest by September 16, 2005. The loan agreement 
provided that, if repayment were more than five days late, there would be "[a] late 
payment penalty of [s]ix percent." River Crossings repaid the loan in full on October 7, 
2005. Because the loan was not repaid within five days of September 16, 2005, Arbogast 
claimed it was entitled to a late payment penalty of over $148,000, plus interest. River 
Crossings stated that it was granted an extension of time to repay the loan and therefore 
contested that it owed any additional amount. Because of the dispute between the parties, 
River Crossings directed that approximately $178,000 be held in escrow until the dispute 
was resolved. These funds were eventually deposited with the trial court. Arbogast, 2008 
UTApp277^[2. 
District Court Proceedings and Disposition 
On January 10, 2006, Arbogast filed a complaint for declaratory judgment, 
seeking to obtain the funds held in escrow. Because River Crossings had previously 
informed Arbogast that it was represented by counsel and because of difficulties serving 
River Crossings directly, the trial court granted Arbogast's motion for alternate service. 
Accordingly, Arbogast served River Crossings' Nevada legal counsel, Black, LoBello & 
Sparks (BLS), with the complaint. Counsel for Arbogast granted BLS at least two 
extensions to make a settlement offer, to seek Utah counsel, or both. According to River 
Crossings, counsel for Arbogast then told BLS, counsel for River Crossings, in June 2006 
that he would not seek default without first notifying them. Id. % 3. 
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On June 28, 2006, BLS communicated a settlement offer to Arbogast's counsel. 
The next day, counsel for Arbogast sent a letter to BLS rejecting the offer. The letter also 
stated as follows: 
My client has previously granted your client an extension of 
time within which to answer the complaint. However, given 
the present state of the case, I am, on behalf of my client, 
hereby requesting that your client file an Answer to the 
complaint within twenty (20) days of the date of this letter. 
Id 14. 
On June 30, 2006 the attorney at BLS primarily responsible for the River 
Crossings matter was terminated. However, the June 29 letter was addressed to two other 
members of the firm who had taken responsibility for the case. On July 25, River 
Crossings1 managing member sent an e-mail to Arbogast's principal. Although the e-mail 
requested that Arbogast's principal call River Crossings' managing member in order to 
"discuss the direction of [the] lawsuit," no further communication occurred. Six days 
later—approximately four months after service of the complaint and more than thirty 
days after the June 29 letter requesting an answer—Arbogast obtained a certificate of 
default from the court clerk. Arbogast did not serve River Crossings or its counsel with a 
copy of this certificate or its subsequent request for default judgment. On August 10, the 
trial judge entered a default judgment. Notice of the judgment was sent to River 
Crossings on August 15. Id. f 5. 
River Crossings filed a rule 60 motion to set aside the default judgment on 
September 26, 2006, and arguments were held February 21, 2007. During arguments, 
River Crossings' Utah legal counsel acknowledged that "this is a close case." Counsel 
5 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
also conceded that a formal appearance had not been entered and that "[Arbogast] didn't 
need to give notice [of the default motions] under Rule 5(2)(a)." In fact, counsel declared 
that he was "not claiming that because an appearance was made notice should have been 
given." The trial court determined "that [River Crossings'] actions and inactions in this 
matter d[id] not rise to the level of excusable neglect, inadvertence, surprise or mistake." 
The trial court also found that although BLS did not formally appear in the action, 
"counsel's notification and communications with [Arbogast]'s counsel constitute an 
appearance and there was adequate notice . . . given to [River Crossings], pursuant to the 
June 29, 2006 letter." Accordingly, the court denied River Crossings' motion. River 
Crossings appealed. Id. % 6. 
Court of Appeals Proceedings and Disposition 
The court of appeals overturned the district court's ruling that River Crossings had 
appeared in the action and, on that basis, affirmed the district court's ultimate conclusion 
that River Crossings was not entitled to service of Plaintiff's default certificate or request 
for entry of default judgment under Rule 5(a). It affirmed judgment in favor of Arbogast. 
DISCUSSION 
I. THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE DO NOT LIMIT AN 
"APPEARANCE" FOR PURPOSES OF RULE 5(a) TO "FORMAL 
APPEARANCES" BEFORE THE COURT. 
Rule 5(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "every judgment, 
every order . . . , every pleading . . . , every paper . . . , every written motion . . . , and 
every written notice, appearance, demand, offer of judgment, and similar paper shall be 
served upon each of the parties. " Utah R. Civ. P. 5(a)(1). As noted by the Utah Court of 
6 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Appeals below, "[t]his rule 'expresses the general principle that notice of all proceedings 
[, including default proceedings,] must be provided to all parties.'" Arbogast Family 
Trust v. River Crossings, LLC, 2008 UT App 277 <j[ 12 (quoting Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 
75, H 20-27). Although no service need be made on parties in default for failure to 
appear, "a party in default for any reason other than for failure to appear must be served 
with all pleadings and papers." Utah R. Civ. P. 5(a)(2)(B). 
At issue on appeal is whether the court of appeals erred in concluding that only a 
"formal appearance" before a court, such as the filing of an answer, could constitute an 
"appearance" under Rule 5(a). No Utah court has directly addressed this issue. Arbogast, 
2008 UT App 277 f 22 ("[T]he supreme court has never explicitly . . . defined what 
constitutes an appearance under rule 5."). This Court has, however, previously held that 
the "federal interpretation [of the notice requirements under rule 5] is persuasive in light 
of the fact that our rule 5 is 'substantially similar to federal rule 5.'" Lund v. Brown, 2000 
UT 75, f 26; see also Plumb v. State, 809 P.2d 734, 740 n.9 (Utah 1990) ("Because there 
is virtually no case law interpreting the Utah rule and because of the close 
correspondence between the federal and state rules, we freely look to federal case law as 
a useful guide.")1 
1
 Courts construing the term "appearance" under Rule 5(a) have also looked to the 
case law interpreting the term "appearance" under Rule 55, governing procedure as to 
defaults, and have interpreted the term identically under both rules. E.g., N.Y. Life Ins. 
Co. v. Brown, 84 F.3d 137, 142 n.5 (5th Cir. 1996) ("This discussion of appearances is 
drawn from caselaw on Rule 55(b)(2) appearances . . . . Rule 5(a) appearances will be 
treated the same, as both 55(b)(2) and 5(a) involve defendants who at one time appeared, 
but later defaulted.") Consequently, this Court can rely on case law interpreting 
7 
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Under the federal rules, an "appearance" is not limited to a direct response to a 
complaint. Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary K. Kane, 10A Fed. Prac. & 
Proc., Civil 3d § 2686. 
An appearance 'may arise by implication from defendant's 
seeking, taking, or agreeing to some step or proceeding in the 
cause beneficial to himself or detrimental to plaintiff other 
than one contesting only the jurisdiction'. 
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Heleasco Seventeen, Inc. v. Drake, 102 F.R.D. 909, 912 
(D.C. Del. 1984) (holding that defendants made an "appearance" when their attorney 
initiated telephone conversations with plaintiffs attorney)). 
A party need merely indicate a "clear purpose to defend the suit" to satisfy the 
appearance requirement under the federal rules. New York v. Green, 420 F.3d 99, 105 
(2nd Cir. 2005). An appearance is "not confined to physical appearances in court or the 
actual filing of a document in the record." N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 84 F.3d 137, 141 
(5th Cir. 1996) (internal citations omitted). 
Appearances include a variety of informal acts on defendant's 
part which are responsive to plaintiff's formal action in court, 
and which may be regarded as sufficient to give plaintiff a 
clear indication of defendant's intention to contest the claims. 
In summary, an appearance is an indication in some way of 
an intent to pursue a defense. This is a relatively low 
threshold. 
appearances under both Rule 5(a) and Rule 55(b)(2) for guidance in defining what 
constitutes an appearance under Rule 5(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
8 
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Id. at 141-42 (citations omitted) (emphasis added) (cited in Wright & Miller, Fed. Prac. & 
Proc. § 1144); accord Sun Bank of Ocala v. Pelican Homestead & Savs. Assoc, 874 F.2d 
274, 276 (5th Cir. 1989); U.S. v. McCoy, 954 F.2d 1000, 1003 (5th Cir. 1992). 
Although this interpretation is sometimes referred to as the "majority" view, such 
a characterization unfortunately conveys the impression of a close, active dispute 
between the circuits. In reality, this "majority" approach is the generally accepted 
practice in virtually all of the federal circuits, save perhaps one. The Seventh Circuit 
alone has generally followed a strict, inflexible approach, holding that only a formal 
submission or presentation to the court can satisfy the demands of the "appearance" 
requirement under Rule 5(a). See e^., Zuelzke Tool & Eng'g Co. v. Anderson Die 
Castings, Inc., 925 F.2d 226, 230 (7th Cir 1991). 
Every other federal circuit to consider the issue has adopted the liberal, equitable 
interpretation of "appearance" under the Rule. The 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 6th, 8th, 9th, and D.C. 
Circuits have all embraced the majority view, as have state and federal district courts in 
Alabama, Delaware, Kansas, Mississippi, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Rhode Island, Texas, and Wisconsin. See, e.g., Muniz v. 
Vidal, 739 F.2d 699, 701 (1st Cir. 1984); Hutton v. Fisher, 359 F.2d 913 (3d Cir. 1966) 
(single telephone request for extension by counsel constituted appearance); N.Y. Life Ins. 
Co. v. Brown, 84 F.3d 137, 141 (5th Cir. 1996) (single telephone call to plaintiffs counsel 
constituted appearance); Lutomski v. Panther Valley Coin Exchange, 653 F.2d 270, 271 
(6th Cir. 1981); U.S. v. Harre, 983 F.2d 128, 130 (8th Cir. 1993) (late-filed and 
subsequently stricken answer constitutes appearance); Wilson v. Moore & Assocs., 564 
9 
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F.2d 366, 369 (9 Cir. 1977) (appearance "need not necessarily be a formal one, i.e., one 
involving a submission or presentation to a court"); H.F. Livermore Corp. v. 
Aktiengesellschaft Gebruder L., 432 F.2d 689, 691-92 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (per curium); 
Cockrell v. World's Finest Chocolate Co., Inc., 349 So.2d 1117, 1120 (Ala. 1977); 
Heleasco Seventeen, Inc. v. Drake, 102 F.R.D. 909, 912 (D. Del. 1984) (telephone 
exchanges between parties' counsel constituted appearance); Ryan Transportation Serv., 
Inc. v. Paschall Servs., Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2141 *6-7 (D. Kans. 2004) 
(appearance where defendant sought extension to seek counsel within jurisdiction); 
Segars v. Hagerman, 99 F.R.D. 274 (N.D. Miss. 1983); Trust Company Bank v. Tingen-
Millford Drapery Co., Inc., 119 F.R.D. 21, 22-23 (E.D.N.C. 1987); Wilson v. Wilson, 
364 N.W.2d 113, 115 (N.D. 1985) (appearance where parties discussed case); Liberty 
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Yackovich, 99 F.R.D. 518 (W.D. Pa. 1982); CSB Corp. v. 
Cadillac Creative Advertising, Inc., 136 F.R.D. 34, 35 (D. R.L 1990) (finding appearance 
based on settlement negotiations); Kinnear Corp. v. Crawford Door Sales Co., 49 F.R.D 3 
(D.S.C. 1970); Dalminter v. Jessie Edwards, 27 F.R.D. 491, 493 (S.D. Tex. 1961) 
(appearance where defendant contact plaintiff's counsel by letter). 
For example, in Heleasco, the court held that telephone exchanges between the 
parties' counsel constituted an appearance, explaining: 
Normally, an appearance is used to signify the overt act by a 
party involving some presentation or submissions to the 
Court's jurisdiction. A defendant, however, need not respond 
directly to the complaint in order for his conduct to constitute 
an appearance. The appearance required by Rule 55(b)(2) has 
been broadly defined and it is not limited to a "formal" court 
appearance. An appearance may arise by implication from 
10 
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defendants seeking, taking or agreeing to some steps or 
proceedings in the cause beneficial to himself or detrimental 
to plaintiff. 
Heleasco, 102 F.R.D at 912 (citing 10 C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Fed. Prac. & 
Proa: Civil 2d f 2686 (1973) (emphasis added)). 
In Lutomski, the Sixth Circuit held that defendants had made an appearance 
entitling them to notice of default where plaintiffs granted two extensions by telephone to 
defendants, explaining: 
Though it is true that defendants made no formal appearance 
and filed no papers, courts now look beyond the presence or 
absence of such formal actions to examine other evidence of 
active representation. Several cases have held that informal 
contacts between parties may constitute an appearance. The 
contacts must "indicate the defaulting party intends to defend 
the suit." 
Lutomski, 653 F.2d at 271 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
In New York Life, the 5th Circuit held that a single telephone call to plaintiffs 
counsel contesting the claim, constituted an appearance. N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 84 
F.3d 137, 141-42 (5th Cir. 1996). 
In Charlton L. Davis & Co., P.C. v. Fedder Data Center, Inc., 556 F.2d 308 (5th 
Cir. 1977), the court held that an appearance had been entered where, after discovering 
the case was in default, counsel "both telephoned and wrote the plaintiffs attorney, 
indicating an intent to defend and requesting an extension of time because of a trial in 
another case." Id. at 308-09. Noting that "[t]he appearance required by the rule has been 
broadly defined, and not limited to a court appearance," the court explained: 
11 
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If the plaintiff felt Financial was guilty of dilatory tactics and 
had no real defense, then notice under Rule 55 would have 
promptly resolved the matter. Instead, the plaintiff sought to 
reap tactical advantage from Financial's prior neglect by 
acquiring in stealth a decision sheltered by the rules which 
protect final judgments. Such practice is what Rule 55 was 
designed to prevent. 
Id. 
These cases are representative of the holdings of virtually every federal court to 
consider the issue of what constitutes an appearance under the federal rules. Given the 
substantial similarity between Rule 5(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 5 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Utah courts should follow the lead of the vast 
majority of federal courts to consider the issue by likewise expressly adopting the 
majority definition of an "appearance" under Rule 5(a). 
II. THE POLICIES UNDERLYING THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
MANDATE A LIBERAL DEFINITION OF "APPEARANCE" UNDER THE 
RULES. 
The majority approach has been so broadly adopted nationwide because it is far 
more in harmony with the policies underlying the procedural rules, which strongly favor 
a hearing of the merits of each case and disfavor procedural technicalities. 
Since the law dislikes judgments by default, courts generally 
would prefer to deny plaintiffs application in favor of a trial 
on the merits. Thus, in order to ensure defendant an 
opportunity to defend against plaintiff's application, a court 
usually will try to find that there has been an appearance by 
defendant, which has the effect of requiring that notice of the 
application for a default be given. 
Wright, Miller & Kane, 10A Fed. Prac. & Proc: Civil 3d § 2686 (emphasis added). 
The policy underlying the modernization of federal 
procedure, namely the abandonment or relaxation of 
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restrictive rules which prevent the hearing of cases on their 
merits is central to this issue. This court has been mindful of 
this policy in its construction of the Rules in order to afford 
litigants a fair opportunity to have their disputes settled by 
reference to the merits. 
Given this approach, the default judgment must normally be 
viewed as available only when the adversary process has been 
halted because of an essentially unresponsive party. . . . The 
notice requirement contained in Rule 55(b)(2) is, however, a 
device intended to protect those parties who, although 
delaying in a formal sense by failing to file pleadings within 
the twenty-day period, have otherwise indicated to the 
moving party a clear purpose to defend the suit. 
H.F. Livermore, 432 F.2d at 691 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are designed for the 
just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of cases on their 
merits, not for the termination of litigation by procedural 
maneuver. Default judgments are a drastic remedy, not 
favored by the Federal Rules and resorted to by courts only in 
extreme situations. 
Sun Bank of Ocala v. Pelican Homestead & Savs. Ass'n, 874 F.2d 274, 276 (5th Cir. 
1989) (emphasis added) (holding that "appearance" under the federal rules must be 
broadly defined). 
Utah courts have likewise repeatedly recognized this fundamental policy 
underlying the procedural rules. 
It is indeed commendable to handle cases with dispatch and 
to move calendars with expedition in order to keep them up to 
date. But it is even more important to keep in mind that the 
very reason for the existence of courts is to afford disputants 
an opportunity to be heard and to do justice between them. 
Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d 876, 879 
(Utah 1975) (emphasis added); see also Heathman v. Fabian & Clendenin, 377 P.2d 189, 
13 
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190 (1962) ("The courts, in the interest of justice and fair play, favor, where possible, a 
full and complete opportunity for a hearing on the merits of every case."); Richards v. 
Baum, 914 P.2d 719, 723 (Utah 1996) (J. Stewart, dissenting) (stating that "rigidity of 
common law code pleading . . . completely ignores the strong policy in our rules of civil 
procedure in favor of deciding cases on their merits rather than on procedural 
technicalities."); Guardian State Bank v. Stangl, 778 P.2d 1, 8 (Utah 1989) ("In Behrens 
v. Raleigh Hills Hosp., Inc., 675 P.2d 1179, 1182 (Utah 1983), we reiterated that the 
policy of our rules of procedure is to decide cases on the merits rather than pleading 
technicalities."). 
The majority position more fully reflects the policies underlying the procedural 
rules by ensuring that parties who have indicated a willingness and intent to participate in 
the proceedings and defend against the claims are not unjustly thrown out of court on a 
technicality. It enables parties to engage in settlement negotiations in an effort to spare 
the time and expense of filing pleadings or hiring local counsel by resolving the matter 
without straining court resources. The majority approach therefore satisfies the policies 
underlying the procedural rules by providing for a "just, speedy, and inexpensive 
disposition of cases on their merits." See Utah R. Civ. Pro. 1; Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 1. 
The so-called minority view, which was the approach embraced by the court of 
appeals below, wholly ignores the core policies behind the rules—policies which strongly 
disfavor default judgments and highly technical interpretations that prevent the hearing of 
cases on their merits. In fact, nowhere in the Arbogast decision did the court of appeals 
address the policy considerations underlying the rules. Instead, the court summarily 
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concluded that "one of the benefits of the minority position is that it creates a bright-line 
test that the clerk can use when determining whether or not default is appropriate." 
Arbogast, 2008 UT App f 20 n.9. However appealing a bright-line test may seem, the 
expressly elucidated policies underlying the rules cannot be ignored simply to make 
things easier for the court clerks. 
Moreover, the minority approach provides no better bright-line test than the more 
liberal, equitable approach followed by the vast majority of courts. The court of appeals 
complained in its decision that, under the majority view, court clerks "cannot determine 
with certainty whether any party has or has not 'appeared' in the action" because they are 
not privy to "discussions or documents exchanged among the parties." Arbogast, 2008 
UT App f 21 n.9 (quoting 10 James Wm. Moore et aL, Moore's Fed. Prac. § 55.33[4][b] 
(3d ed. 2008)). Yet, clerks also are unaware of other matters that may affect the entry of 
a default, such as whether an extension of time to respond to a complaint has been agreed 
to between the parties. The clerk cannot determine with certainty whether default is 
appropriate even under the minority approach. 
In reality, formal adoption of the majority rale would not drastically change 
current practices regarding default judgments. It would not prevent court clerks from 
entering default if it appeared from the record that no appearance had been made. It 
would simply provide a more equitable opportunity for defaulted parties who have 
attempted to defend themselves to reverse the default judgment and have their day in 
court. It also would provide an extra safeguard against procedural maneuvers and default 
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judgments against unsuspecting defendants, thereby satisfying the policy demands 
underlying the rules without increasing the burden on court clerks. 
III. UTAH CASE LAW IS MORE CONSISTENT WITH THE MAJORITY 
VIEW. 
The court of appeals erroneously concluded in its decision below that Utah case 
law dictated adoption of the minority view of Rule 5(a). Although acknowledging that 
"the supreme court has never explicitly addressed the two competing lines of authority or 
defined what constitutes an appearance under rule 5," the court of appeals nevertheless 
contended that adoption of the minority view was mandated by two Utah Supreme Court 
cases: Central Bank & Trust Co. v. Jensen and Lund v. Brown. Arbogast, 2008 UT f 22. 
This conclusion was based on an imprecise reading of these cases. 
The facts in Central Bank & Trust Co. v. Jensen, 656 P.2d 1009 (Utah 1982) are a 
bit convoluted. After receiving Central Bank's initial complaint, the defendants' attorney 
contacted Central Bank's counsel, requesting copies of the pleadings. Id. at 1010. Central 
Bank's counsel refused to provide them unless defendants entered a general appearance. 
Default judgment was subsequently entered after defendants failed to file an answer. 
Central Bank's counsel did not provide notice of default to the defendants. Id. 
Instead, when defendants' counsel again contacted him four days after the default was 
entered to request copies of the complaint, Central Bank's counsel served a second 
summons and complaint on defendant—even though default had already been entered on 
the first complaint. Id. at 1011. Defendants then filed an answer and counterclaim to the 
second complaint, which Central Bank moved to strike on the basis that default had 
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already been entered on the first complaint. Defendants were not aware that default had 
been entered until that time. Id. 
On appeal, the defendants argued that "upon receipt of the answer and 
counterclaim" and "in light of communications between counsel," Central Bank's 
counsel had an obligation to notify their attorney of the default judgment already entered. 
Id. (emphasis added). Although passing reference was made to the "communications 
between counsel," it does not appear that defendants argued to the Court that the single 
telephone call from their attorney to plaintiff's attorney prior to default constituted an 
appearance. See id. Rather, it appears that the defendants were arguing that when their 
attorney contacted Central Bank the second time and then filed an answer, Central Bank 
was obligated to notify them of the default that had already been entered against them. In 
response, the Court merely stated that "the rules expressly exclude parties in default from 
those entitled to notice." Id. In other words, because default had already been entered, 
Central Bank's attorney was not obligated to notify the defendants of that default even 
when their attorney subsequently contacted Central Bank and filed an answer. 
Even if the Central Bank defendants were suggesting that their single request for 
copies of the pleadings prior to default constituted an appearance—which certainly is not 
evident from the record—it does not appear that counsel or the Court were aware of, 
much less analyzed, the abundant case law supporting the conclusion that a formal 
pleading was not required to entitle defendants to notice under Rule 5(a). In fact, there is 
no analysis of the issue whatsoever. The Court appears simply to have assumed, without 
any independent research, discussion or analysis, that the defendants had not appeared 
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and were in default, and then summarily rejected any claims of entitlement to notice. Id. 
To construe the Central Bank case as standing for the proposition that only a formal 
appearance before the court can constitute an appearance under Rule 5, when that issue 
was never raised before the Court, would be inaccurate and improper. 
Moreover, the facts in Central Bank present a prime example of why most federal 
circuits have liberally defined "appearance" under Rule 5(a). Such unethical procedural 
maneuvers are directly contrary to the policies underlying the rules. 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are designed for the 
just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of cases on their 
merits, not for the termination of litigation by procedural 
maneuver. 
Sun Bank of Ocala v. Pelican Homestead & Savs. Ass'n, 874 F.2d 274, 276 (5th Cir. 
1989) (emphasis added). A judicial interpretation of Rule 5(a) that would sanction such 
conduct at the expense of the intent and purpose of the rules cannot be supported. 
In Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75, 11 P.3d 277, the second case relied upon by the 
court of appeals below, the defendants filed an answer and counterclaim to the plaintiff's 
complaint, but the plaintiff failed to respond to the counterclaim because he mistakenly 
believed that an intervening bankruptcy had stayed the proceedings. Id. f|[ 3-4. Without 
providing notice, the defendants sought default against the plaintiff on the counterclaim, 
which default was subsequently entered. Id. f 5. 
Although the Court overturned the default judgment under Rule 60(b), it 
nevertheless went on to address the plaintiffs claim to lack of notice under Rule 5 in 
order to take the opportunity to clarify the notice requirements for motions for default 
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judgment, which were "not a model of clarity." Id. f][ 20-21. Before ever reaching the 
facts of the case, the Lund Court carefully construed the language of Rule 5(a) under the 
Utah Rules and concluded that "notice should be given to parties in default who have 
made an appearance." Id. f 24. The Court further elaborated: 
There is an obvious policy justification for distinguishing 
between these two classes of defaulting parties. A much more 
compelling case can be made for requiring notice to a party 
who is in default but has nonetheless elected to participate at 
some level in an action than for requiring notice to a party 
who has declined to participate in any regard by simply 
ignoring previous notice given in the form of the complaint. 
Id. 
The Court then explained that the "validity" of this interpretation was confirmed 
by the fact that it "mirrors the interpretation that has been made of its federal 
counterpart." Id. ff 25-26. The two sources to which the Court cited for this proposition 
were the well-respected Wright & Miller treatise and the case of New York Life Ins. Co. 
v. Brown, 84 F.3d 137 (5th Cir. 1996). As discussed in detail in section I, supra, these 
two sources both expressly declare that a "formal appearance" is not required to trigger 
the notice requirements under Rule 5(a) and are firmly in the "majority" camp. The court 
in New York Life emphatically declared: 
What constitutes an appearance is not "confined to physical 
appearances in court or the actual filing of a document in the 
record." Appearances "include a variety of informal acts on 
defendant's part which are responsive plaintiffs formal action 
in court, and which may be regarded as sufficient to give 
plaintiff a clear indication of defendant's intention to contest 
the claim." In summary, an appearance is an indication "in 
some way fofl an intent to pursue a defense." This is ^a 
relatively low threshold." 
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N.Y. Life, 84 F.3d 137, 141-42 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). The New 
York Life court then went on to hold that a single telephone call from the defendant to 
plaintiff's counsel constituted an appearance, triggering notice requirements under Rule 
5(a): 
[H]is phone call to New York Life's counsel, informing him 
that he would contest the suit, is also an appearance. 
Id. at 142. 
Against this backdrop, it is more than a bit surprising that the court of appeals 
could have relied so heavily on Lund for its conclusion that Utah case law dictates 
adoption of the minority view of Rule 5(a)—holding that only a formal appearance 
before the court triggers notice requirements. It did so, in part, due to an overreliance on 
the precedential value of Central Bank, a case cited in Lund. As explained above, it does 
not appear that the Central Bank Court ever reached the issue of what precisely 
constitutes an appearance under Rule 5(a) or whether something less than a "formal 
appearance" might constitute an appearance for purpose of notice. The Lund Court 
therefore cited to Central Bank solely for the proposition that a party who has made an 
appearance is entitled to notice of default, while a party who has not made an appearance 
is not entitled to notice of default. Lund, 2000 UT 75 <|[27. 
Because there was no dispute as to whether the defaulting party in Lund had made 
an appearance, there was no need whatsoever for the Lund Court to delve into the depths 
of what constitutes an appearance under Rule 5(a). The Lund Court, therefore, had no 
reason to attempt to construe, distinguish, or disavow Central Bank on those grounds. As 
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in Central Bank, there is no analysis at all in Lund on the issue of formal versus informal 
appearance. Instead the Lund Court merely restated the assumption of Central Bank— 
that no appearance had been entered in that case—without going any further. 
The court of appeals' improper reliance on Lund also resulted from its misreading 
of statement made by this Court in that case, that "[a] much more compelling case can be 
made for requiring notice to a party who is in default but has nonetheless elected to 
participate at some level." Arbogast, 2007 UT App. 277 f 18 n.8 (quoting Lund, 2000 UT 
75 f 24). Although the court of appeals was correct that this statement was not made in 
specifically addressing what constitutes an appearance, it also was not made, as the court 
suggested, in reference to the specific facts of Lund nor limited thereto. Id. Rather, this 
statement was made in the abstract—in construing the language of Rule 5(a) in light of 
the vital policy considerations at play. They are the same policy considerations relied 
upon by courts and commentators alike in support of the "majority" view that a party 
who has "elected to participate at some level" has made an appearance for purposes of 
Rule 5(a) and is entitled to notice. 
Ironically, in direct opposition to the court of appeals' holding below, the Lund 
case actually provides strong support for the contention that Utah has adopted—or should 
adopt—the "majority" view of Rule 5(a). It cites to federal case law and notable treatises 
which espouse the majority view. It also acknowledges and emphasizes the important 
policy considerations underlying this view that notice should be given to defaulting 
parties who have participated at some level in order to ensure a hearing on the merits of 
the case. Surely neither Central Bank nor Lund provide a sufficient basis for embracing a 
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rigid, highly technical interpretation of Rule 5(a) that has been nearly universally rejected 
by other courts and flies in the face of the policies underlying the rule. 
IV. THE UTAH RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CIVILITY MANDATE 
ADOPTION OF THE MAJORITY VIEW. 
The so-called minority view is also plainly inconsistent with the Utah Standards of 
Professionalism and Civility, which were expressly adopted by the Utah Supreme Court 
in its Rules of Professional Practice. Rule 14-301(16) states as follows: 
Lawyers shall not cause the entry of a default without first 
notifying other counsel whose identity is known, unless their 
clients' legitimate rights could be adversely affected. 
Id. (emphasis added). Under the minority approach, Utah attorneys would not be 
required to provide notice of default to opposing counsel with whom they had negotiated 
unless they had made a "formal appearance." Yet, in doing so, they would be placed in 
the untenable position of complying with the Rules of Civil Procedure while directly 
violating the Rules of Professional Practice. This is no mere hypothetical. As 
acknowledged by the court of appeals below, this nonsensical result is precisely what has 
occurred in this case. Arbogast 2008 UT App f 21 n.10. According to the court of 
appeals, Arbogast's counsel, Mr. Utley, acted in full compliance with Rule 5(a) when he 
failed to provide notice of default to River Crossings while at the same time directly 
violating his professional obligations under Rule 14-301(16). Id. Surely, the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure cannot be construed to present such an absurdity and a trap for unwary 
attorneys. 
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On the other hand, adoption of the majority rule perfectly comports with Utah's 
Rules of Professional Practice. An attorney who provided notice of default to opposing 
counsel with whom he or she had been in communication would satisfy both the demands 
of Rule 5(a) and the ethical obligations of Rule 14-301(16). 
CONCLUSION 
Rule 5(a) mandates notice for defaulting parties who have appeared by uelect[ing] 
to participate at some level" in the case. This view of Rule 5(a) has been adopted by 
nearly every court to consider the issue and best comports with existing Utah case law. 
This view also is most consistent with the policy considerations underlying the state and 
federal procedural rules and the Utah Rules of Professional Practice. For the foregoing 
reasons, Appellant River Crossings, LLC respectfully requests that the court of appeals' 
decision be reversed and remanded. 
DATED this 31st day of December, 2008. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & 
MCCARTHY 
By: 
Scott M. Lilja 
Nicole M. Deforge 
Attorneys for River Crossings, LLC 
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OPINION 
[**41] McHUGH ^f Judge: 
[*P1] River Crossings, LLC (River Crossings) appeals the trial court's denial of its rule 60(fr) motion to set aside a 
default judgment. See Utah R. Civ. P. 60fb^. We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
[*P2] Arbogast Family Trust (Arbogast) provided River Crossings a $ 2,450,000 loan. The loan was to be repaid with 
interest by September 16, 2005. If repayment was more than five days late, the loan agreement provided for "[a] late 
payment penalty of [s]ix percent." River Crossings repaid the loan in full on October 7, 2005. Because the loan was not 
repaid within five days of September 16, 2005, Arbogast claimed it was entitled to a late payment penalty of over $ 
148,000, plus interest. River Crossings stated that it was granted an extension of time to repay the loan and therefore 
contested that it owed any additional amount. Because of the dispute between the parties, River Crossings 
[***2] directed that approximately $ 178,000 be held in escrow until the dispute was resolved. These funds were 
eventually deposited with the trial court. 
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[*P3] On January 10, 2006, Arbogast filed a complaint for declaratory judgment, seeking to obtain the funds held in 
escrow. Because River Crossings had previously informed Arbogast that it was represented by counsel and because of 
difficulties serving River Crossings directly, the trial court granted Arbogast's motion for alternate service. Accordingly, 
Arbogast served River Crossings' Nevada legal counsel, Black, LoBello & Sparks (BIS), with the complaint. a Counsel for 
Arbogast granted BLS at least two extensions to make a settlement offer, to seek Utah counsel, or both. According to 
River Crossings, counsel for Arbogast then told BLS in June 2006 that he would not seek default without first notifying it. 
jFOOTNOTES 
I I River Crossings' counsel on appeal did not represent River Crossings during any of the proceedings in the trial court. 
l*P4] On June 28, 2006, BLS communicated a settlement offer to Arbogast's counsel. The next day, counsel for 
Arbogast sent a letter to BLS rejecting the offer. The letter also stated as follows: 
My client has previously granted your [***3] client an extension of time within which to answer the 
complaint. However, given the [**42] present state of the case, I am, on behalf of my client, hereby 
requesting that your client file an Answer to the complaint within twenty (20) days of the date of this letter. 
[*P5] On June 30, the BLS attorney primarily responsible for the River Crossings matter was terminated. However, the 
June 29 letter was addressed to two other members of the firm who had taken responsibility for the case. On July 25, 
River Crossings' managing member sent an e-mail to Arbogast's principal. Although the e-mail requested that Arbogast's 
principal call River Crossings' managing member in order to "discuss the direction of [the] lawsuit," no further 
communication occurred. Six days iater-approximateiy four months after sen/ice of the complaint and more than thirty 
days after the June 29 letter requesting an answer--Arbogast obtained a certificate of default from the court clerk. 
Arbogast did not provide River Crossings a copy of this certificate or its subsequent request for default judgment. On 
August 10, the trial judge entered a default judgment Notice of the judgment was sent to River Crossings on August 15. 
[*P6] River [***4] Crossings filed a rule 60 motion to set aside the default judgment on September 26, 2006, and 
arguments were held February 21, 2007. 2 During arguments, River Crossings' Utah legal counsel acknowledged that 
"this is a close case." Counsel also conceded that a formal appearance had not been entered and that "[Arbogast] didn't 
need to give notice [of the default motions] under Rule 5(a)(2)." In fact, counsel declared that he was "not claiming that 
because an appearance was made notice should have been given." The trial court determined "that [River Crossings'] 
actions and inactions in this matter d[id] not rise to the level of excusable neglect, inadvertence, surprise or mistake." 
The trial court also found that although BLS did not formally appear in the action, "counsel's notification and 
communications with [ArbogasfJ's counsel constitute an appearance and there was adequate notice . . . given to [River 
Crossings], pursuant to the June 29, 2006 letter." Accordingly, the court denied River Crossings' motion. River Crossings 
appeals. 
I FOOTNOTES 
) | 
j 2 By this time, River Crossings had hired a Utah law firm to represent it before the trial court. j 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
[*P7] River Crossings presents [***5] three arguments on appeal. First, River Crossings argues that the default 
judgment should have been set aside because Arbogast failed to provide the notice required by rule 5(a) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. HN1^n[T]he interpretation of a rule of procedure is a question of law that we review for 
correctness." Brown v. Glover. 2000 UT 89. P15, 16 P.3d 540. 
[*P8] Second, River Crossings argues that "the district court abusefd] its limited discretion in refusing to set aside the 
default judgment." HN2+"[A] trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether to set aside a default judgment." Lund v. 
Brown. 2000 UT 75, P 9, 11 P.3d 277. However, "the court's discretion is not unlimited." Id. 
[*P9] Third, River Crossings argues that the trial court's "refusfal] to set aside the default judgment [was] based on 
faulty findings of fact." " " - ^ h i s court will reverse a trial court's factual findings only if the marshaled evidence 
demonstrates that they are clearly erroneous. See Bingham Consolidation Co. v. Groesbeck, 2004 UT App 434. P 14r 105 
P.3d 365. 
ANALYSIS 
I. Rule 5(a) 
[*P10] Because of River Crossings' statements before the trial court and Arbogast's arguments on appeal, we begin by 
addressing whether River Crossings' [***6] rule 5 arguments were preserved.3 WW4"?"'[A]s a general rule, claims not 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Get a Document - by Citation - 2008 UT App 277 Page 4 of 9 
raised before the trial court may not be raised on appeal.'" Tschaaoenv v. Milbank Ins. Co.. 2007 UT 37. 20. r**431 
163 P.3d 615 (alteration in original) (quoting Stare v. Cram. 2002 UT 37. P 9. 46 P.3d 230V 
Two policy considerations underlie th[is] preservation rule. First, the rule exists to give the trial court an 
opportunity to address the claimed error, and if appropriate, correct it. Second, requiring preservation of an 
issue prevents a party from avoiding the issue at trial for strategic reasons only to raise the issue on appeal if 
the strategy fails. 
Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
; FOOTNOTES 
; 3 Our inquiry is made more difficult by River Crossings' failure to provide a "citation to the record showing that the 
i issue was preserved" as required by rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, see Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5) 
(A). 
[*P11] In this case, River Crossings' trial counsel did very little to raise the rule 5 issue before the trial court4 and 
actually made statements during oral arguments that conflict with its position on appeal. Nevertheless, the trial court 
specifically considered this issue and expressly [***7] found 
[t]hat pursuant to [the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure] Rule 5(a)(2), [River Crossings'] counsel has not 
formally appeared in the instant action. Nevertheless, [River Crossings'] counsel's notification and 
communications with [Arbogastjs counsel constitute an appearance and there was adequate notice [] given 
to [River Crossings], pursuant to the June 29, 2006 letter, that an answer was required to be filed in 
. response to [Arbogast]'s complaint. 
The trial court's findings do not simply mirror River Crossings' concessions but instead demonstrate a deeper analysis, 
which expressly addresses the application of rule 5. River Crossings does not challenge the trial court's finding that an 
appearance was entered, but rather the court's legal interpretation of rule 5 as stated in its ruling. Neither of the two 
policy considerations for the preservation requirement prevent our review where the trial court has actually ruled on the 
issue, and River Crossings' arguments do not suggest a strategic decision to postpone review. We therefore hold that, 
under the facts of this case, this issue is sufficiently preserved for appellate review. 5 Cf. Pratt v. Nelson. 2007 UT 41. P 
24. 164 P.3d 366 [***8] (determining issue was preserved where trial court received some notice of the issue and 
"made a specific ruling on the issue" even though petitioner did not address it in a timely manner). 
I FOOTNOTES 
; 4 River Crossings argues that it "tirelessly raised the issue of lack of notice of the default proceedings at every stage 
, in this litigation." While River Crossings did address the lack of notice before the trial court, its arguments focused on 
j whether notice was required because of Arbogast's assurance that it would not seek default without first notifying 
\ BLS. That issue is distinct from the issue on appeal, i.e., whether River Crossings was entitled to notice under rule 5 
j of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
} 5 We caution that a concession by trial counsel generally will prevent appellate review. See First Equity Corp. of 
j Florida v. Utah State Univ.. 544 P.2d 887. 892 n.5 (Utah 19751 ("Ordinarily, an appellant cannot raise a theory on 
| appeal for the first time different from that presented to the Court below."); see also Pratt v. Nelson. 2007 UT 41, P 
I 17. 164 P.3d 366 ("[A] party cannot take advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court 
I into committing the error."). [***9] However, this case is unique because the trial court independently researched, 
j analyzed, and determined the issue at hand, and that determination is part of the decision on appeal. 
[*P12] Having determined that this issue is properly before us, we turn now to its merits. Hyv5?Rule 5(a) declares that 
"every judgment, every order. . . , every pleading . . . , every paper . . . , every written motion . . . , and every written 
notice, appearance, demand, offer of judgment, and similar paper shall be served upon each of the parties." Utah R. Civ. 
P. 5(a)(1). The rule "expresses the general principle that notice of all proceedings^ including default proceedings,] must 
be provided to all parties." Lund. 2000 UT 75. PP 20-27. 11 P.3d 277. However, M[n]o service need be made on parties in 
default. , . for failure to appear." Utah R. Civ. P. 5(a)(2). 
[*P13] River Crossings argues that the trial court correctly determined that it had entered an appearance, but erred 
when it ruled that "adequate notice was given to [River Crossings] pursuant to the June 29, 2006 letter." Because we 
agree with Arbogast's argument that the trial court erred when it determined that River Crossings had entered an 
appearance, we need not address [***10] [**44] River Crossings* contention regarding the sufficiency of notice. 
[*P14] Two cases from the Utah Supreme Court have interpreted rule 5 and addressed what constitutes an 
appearance. In Central Bank & Trust Co. v. Jensen. 656 P.2d 1009 (Utah 1982)r defense counsel contacted the plaintiffs 
counsel after the complaint was filed, advised counsel that he was representing the defendants, and discussed the 
complaint. See id. at 1010. The next day, defense counsel wrote a letter "requesting copies of the pleadings and all other 
documents." Id. The plaintiffs counsel "answered the letter, refusing to supply documentation to aid . . . in making a 
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special appearance, but expressing a willingness to cooperate if [the defendants] appeared generally." Id. A few weeks 
later, the plaintiff obtained a default judgment without notifying the defendants or serving them under rule 5. See id.; 
see also Utah R. Civ. P. 5. On appeal, the defendants argued that the default should be set aside because the plaintiff 
"had an obligation under RuleM 5 . . . to notify" the defendants. Central Bank & Trust 656 P.2d at 1011. The supreme 
court disagreed, "concluding] that plaintiff was under no duty to notify defendants [***11] of the default," id,, and 
subsequently explained that the Central Bank & Trust defendants "never made an appearance prior to having default 
judgment entered against [them]," Lund v. Brown. 2000 UT 75. P 27. 11 P.3d 277 (discussing Central Bank & Trust); see 
also Central Bank & Trust 656 P.2d at 1011-12 & n.2 (emphasizing that "[n]o service need be made on parties in default 
for failure to appear" (emphasis omitted)).' 
[*P15] In Lund v. Brown. 2000 UT 75. 11 P.3d 277. the plaintiffs filed a complaint, and the defendants filed an answer 
and counterclaim. See id.P 3. However, the plaintiffs never filed a reply to the counterclaim, and the defendants obtained 
default judgment without serving the plaintiffs with copies of the default papers pursuant to rule 5. See id. P4-5. The 
plaintiffs appealed the default judgment, arguing that they were entitled to service under rule 5. See id. PP 1. 6, The 
supreme court agreed and reversed the default judgment. 6 See id. P 1. Notably, the supreme court distinguished Lund 
from Central Bank & Trust on the basis that Lund involved a "formal appearance" while Central Bank & Trust did not. See 
id. P 27. 
FOOTNOTES 
\ 6 The plaintiffs in Lund actually presented two arguments on* [***12] appeal: (1) "[T]hat they were reasonably 
| justified, for rule 60(b) purposes, in not replying to the [defendants' counterclaim" and (2) "that the [defendants' 
(failure to notify them of the default motion justifies their failure to respond." Lund v. Brown. 2000 UT 75, 14, 11 P.3d 
I 277. The supreme court found sufficient justification to reverse based solely on the first issue. See id. P20. The court 
I then addressed the second argument "to clarify the requirements of the procedural rules." Id. The court determined 
; there was "additional justification" for reversal based on the defendants' failure to comply with rule 5. Id. 
[*P16] Based on these two supreme court rulings, Arbogast argues that unless a party enters a formal appearance 
through a pleading in the trial court, it has not appeared and is not entitled to service under rule 5 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Because we believe Central Bank & Trust and Lund dictate this result, we agree. 
[*P17] To fully understand the import of Central Bank & Trust and Lund, it is helpful to examine the manner in which 
other jurisdictions, and especially the federal courts, have interpreted similar rules. See id. (relying on outside sources). 
These jurisdictions [***13] have adhered to one of two conflicting positions when determining what constitutes an 
appearance. 
[*P18] The first, and the majority position, "is that 'the notice requirement. . .' applies not only to parties who have 
formally appeared, but also to 'those parties who, although delaying in a formal sense by foiling to file pleadings within 
the twenty-day period, have otherwise indicated to the moving party a clear purpose to defend the suit.'" New York v. 
Green, 420 F.3d 99. 105 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting H.F. Livermore Corp. v. Aktienoesellschaft Gebruder Loepfe, 139 U.S. 
ADD. D.C. 256, 432 F.2d 689. 691 (D.C Cir. 1970) (per curiam)); see also id. (collecting cases); New York Life Ins. Co. v. 
Brown, 84 F.3d 137, 142 (5th Cir. 1996) ("What constitutes an appearance is not confined to physical appearances in 
[**45] court or the actual filing of a document in the record."(internal quotation marks omitted)). River Crossings 
argues that Utah has adopted this standard. 7 However, if this were truly the standard in Utah, we believe Central Bank & 
Trust would have been decided differently or disavowed by Lund. 8 
] FOOTNOTES j 
i i 
\ 7 Even if Utah had adopted this standard, it is questionable whether River Crossings' actions actually indicated "a ! 
j clear [***14] purpose to defend the suit." See New York v. Green. 420 F.3d 99f 105 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal j 
j quotation marks omitted). Although River Crossings participated in multiple settlement discussions, it did so through j 
j its Nevada counsel; it does not appear that River Crossings obtained Utah counsel—a necessary step for defending a I 
j lawsuit in Utah—until after the default judgment had been entered. See generally Utah Supreme Court Rules of ProPI j 
I Practice R. 14-802 ("[0]nly persons who are active, licensed members of the Bar in good standing may engage in the \ 
j practice of law in Utah."). 
• j 
18 The supreme court did acknowledge in Lund that "[a] much more compelling case can be made for requiring notice j 
j to a party who is in default but has nonetheless elected to participate ar some level." 200Q UT 75. P 24. 11 P.3d 277 I 
j (emphasis added). However, the court was not discussing what constitutes an appearance. See id. PP 23-26. Rather, | 
I the court was addressing whether or not service was required when a party appeared and then defaulted. See id. 4, j 
j 23-26 (addressing situation where, after filing the complaint, the plaintiffs did not answer the defendants' I 
j counterclaim because they believed the action was stayed when [***15] the plaintiff filed for bankruptcy). j 
1 Moreover, far from disavowing Central Bank & Trust, the court reaffirmed that case by reiterating that n[i]n Central I 
[ Bank & Trust, the defaulting party never made an appearance." Id. P 27. 
[*P19] In Central Bank & Trust, the defendants not only had multiple contacts; with the plaintiffs, but also specifically 
discussed the complaint with plaintiffs' counsel and indicated that they intended to defend by entering a special 
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821 P.2d 465, 466 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) ("A special appearance is to contest a court's personal jurisdiction without 
submitting oneself to it."). Nevertheless, the supreme court later determined that the defendants "never made an 
appearance." Lund. 2000 UT 75. P 27. 11 P.3d 277 (discussing Central Bank & Trust). Thus, Central Bank & Trust departs 
from with the majority rule, which merely requires an indication of "a clear purpose to defend the suit." See Green, 420 
F.3d at 105 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
[*P20] On the other hand, the position applied by a minority of jurisdictions is consistent with the Utah Supreme 
Court's rulings in Central [***16] Bank & Trust and Lund. Under this standard, H/V6:?courts "strictly construe[] the term 
'appearance' to require a party to make 'some presentation or submission to the district court in the pending action.'" Id± 
(quoting Zuelzke Tool & Ena'g Co. v. Anderson Die Castings. Inc.. 925 F.2d 226. 230 (7th Cir. 1991)): accord Plaza del 
Laao Townhomes Ass'n v. Hiohwood Builders. LLC. 148 P.3d 367. 370-71 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006); see also Black's Law 
Dictionary 107 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "appearance" as "[a] coming into court as a party or interested 
person" (emphasis added)); 10 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice 5 55.33[4][b1 (3d ed. 2008) ("The 
Seventh Circuit has the better linguistic and practical argument"). 9 Under this standard, the supreme court's rulings in 
Central Bank & Trust and Lund are easily understood. In Central Bank & Trust, the defendant never made any 
presentation to the district court, see 656 P.2d at 1009-10, and thus "never made an appearance," Lund v. Brown. 2000 
UT 75, 27. 11 P.3d 277 (discussing Central Bank & Trust). In Lund, the plaintiffs made a presentation to the district court 
by filing a complaint and, therefore, were deemed to have appeared. See id. 
FOOTNOTES 
I 9 Because [***17] the court clerk is authorized to enter default judgment under rule 55 only if the party is in 
\ default for failure to appear and the other requirements are met, see Utah R. Civ. P. 55(b), one of the benefits of the ; 
; minority position is that it creates a bright-line test that the clerk can use when determining whether or not default is ! 
| appropriate. In contrast, "[t]he clerk is in no position to know whether there have been discussions or documents 
\ exchanged among the parties and thus, under the majority definition of the term, cannot determine with certainty ) 
I whether any party has or has not 'appeared' in the action." 10 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice § I 
J 55.33f4]fb1 (3d ed. 2008). I 
[*P21] Despite the holdings of Central Bank & Trust and Lund, River Crossings [**46] argues that Utah could not 
have adopted the minority position because it would be incompatible with Utah's Standards of Professionalism and 
Civility. We do not believe the two are incompatible. The Standards of Professionalism and Civility require notice before 
obtaining default. See Utah Standards of Professionalism & Civility 16 ("Lawyers shall not cause the entry of a default 
without first notifying other counsel whose [***18] identity is known . . . ."). Rule 5, on the other hand, concerns 
service at the time of filing. See Utah R. Civ. P. 5. Thus, a party can easily comply with the standards of civility, even 
though service is not required under rule 5. For example, in this case, counsel would have acted in conformity with the 
standards of civility, even though he did not serve the actual papers under rule 5. ifhe had first called defense counsel 
and alerted him that default was imminent. 10 
J FOOTNOTES j 
110 During oral arguments on appeal, counsel for Arbogast stated that he believed his June 29, 2006 letter constituted | 
j sufficient notice under the Standards of Professionalism and Civility. We have no reason to question the sincerity of | 
I that belief. We think, however, the applicable standard requires more than a prospective notice that a complaint will j 
j be due in twenty days. Otherwise, a summons, which by rule informs a defendant when an answer is due, see Utah R. j 
j Civ. P. 4(c)(1), would also be sufficient notice, and the applicable standard would have added little. We therefore j 
I interpret this particular standard as requiring notice after the allotted passage of time for filing an answer but before j 
j a party actually seeks [***19] to obtain the entry of default. I 
[*P22] Although the supreme court has never explicitly addressed the two competing lines of authority or defined what 
constitutes an appearance under rule 5, we believe the holdings of Central Bank & Trust and Lund place us among the 
jurisdictions that require a presentation or submission to the district court. Because River Crossings' legal counsel, like 
the defendants' legal counsel in Central Bank & Trust, never "ma[d]e some presentation or submission to the district 
court," Green. 420 F.3d at 105, we hold that River Crossings never made an appearance pursuant to rule 5. For these 
reasons, we affirm the trial court's ruling on this issue. 
II. Rule 60(b) 
[*P23] River Crossings argues "the district court abused its discretion in refusing to set a[si]de the default judgment 
[because River Crossings] presented a 'reasonable excuse' for failing to File a responsive pleading." (Capitalization 
omitted.)""7? Under rule 60(b), a "court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from 
a final judgment, order, or proceeding for . . . mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." Utah R. Civ. P. 60 
(b). Although a trial court has broad [***20] discretion when determining whether to set aside default judgment under 
rule 60(b), "the court's discretion is not unlimited." Lund. 2000 UT 75. P 9. 11 P.3d 277. Indeed, "the [disfavored] nature 
of a default judgment and the equitable nature of rule 60 provide . . . limits." Id. P 10. Thus, "it is quite uniformly 
regarded as an abuse of discretion to refuse to vacate a default judgment where there is reasonable justification or 
excuse for the defendant's failure to appear, and timely application is made to set it aside." Id. P 11 (internal quotation 
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[*P24] River Crossings presents several arguments that it claims demonstrate a "good faith, legitimate belief that no 
action would or could be taken against them." See id. P 19 (determining such a belief "constitutes a 'reasonable 
justification or excuse'"). 31 
j FOOTNOTES 
! i i River Crossings' primary argument to the trial court was that counsel had mistakenly believed the Utah Rules of 
[ Civil Procedure were similar to the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure, which require three days notice before entering 
! default judgment when a party has appeared. Compare Utah R. Civ. P. 55, with [***21] Nev. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). 
I See also McNairv. Rivera, 110 Nev. 463. 874 P.2d 1240, 1245 (Nev. 1994) ("An appearance for purposes of NRCP 55 j 
j (b)(2) does not require a presentation or submission to the court; indeed, a course of negotiation between attorneys j 
\ is sufficient to constitute an appearance . . . ." (internal quotation marks omitted)). River Crossings does not raise 
j this argument on appeal. 
[*P25] First, River Crossings argues that "[b]ased on [Arbogast's counsel's express representation[] that he would not 
initiate default proceedings against River Crossings without first notifying opposing counsel, River [**47] Crossings 
reasonably and justifiably believed that no action would be taken against it." Arbogast argues that it made this 
representation, if at all, only so that River Crossings would have adequate time to present a settlement offer or obtain 
local counsel. 12 Arbogast further argues that once counsel sent the June 29, 2006 letter rejecting River Crossings' 
settlement offer and requesting an answer, it was no longer reasonable for River Crossings to believe that it need not 
answer the complaint. The trial court agreed with Arbogast and found "[t]hat the contention that [River Crossings'] 
counsel [***22] expected notice prior to the default entry is unfounded given the express provisions of the June 29, 
2006 letter" requesting that an answer be filed. 
j FOOTNOTES 
j 12 Arbogast primarily contends that no such statement promising notification before default was made. 
[*P26] Second, River Crossings argues that it has a reasonable excuse for not filing an answer because the attorney at 
BLS "who had been responsible for negotiating and communicati[ng] with [Arbogast] was discharged, and the attorney 
who assumed those responsibilities went on an extended vacation." However, as the trial court found, the discharged BLS 
attorney was removed from the case before the June 29, 2006 letter. Indeed, the June 29 letter was sent to the two 
lawyers who had assumed the responsibilities of the discharged attorney. Moreover, even if one of the replacement 
attorneys was on extended vacation, the other attorney was not. In fact, River Crossings declared to the trial court that it 
"d[id]n't want to make a big fact about" the other lawyer's vacation "because [her colleague] was aware of what was 
going on." 13 Despite this awareness, no answer was filed. Thus, the trial court found that this "excuse[] . . . d[id] not 
constitute f ***23] excusable neglect, inadvertent surprise or mistake." 
I FOOTNOTES 
j 13 Even if counsel was not aware of the proceedings in this case, we are not convinced that relief under rule 60(b) 
| would be required. See generally Swallow v. Kennard. 2008 UTApp 134, PP 16. 21-24, 183 P.3d 1052 (holding j 
j problems with counsel's mail were not sufficient grounds for rule 60 relief where counsel did not act with due j 
j diligence). j 
[*P27] Third, River Crossings argues that its "attorneys believed that settlement negotiations were ongoing." River 
Crossings bases this argument primarily on an e-mail that its managing member sent directly to Arbogast's principal—but 
not to Arbogast's counsel. In that e-mail, River Crossings' managing member simply stated, "Give me a call when you get 
a chance. We should probably discuss the direction of your lawsuit." Even assuming that the e-mail implied continued 
settlement discussions, it was not reasonable to assume that it freed River Crossings from filing an answer. This is 
especially true because the e-mail was not sent by River Crossings' legal counsel, Arbogast never responded to the e-
mail, and Arbogast had explicitly rejected River Crossings' settlement efforts and requested an answer [***24] in its 
June 29 letter. Accordingly, the trial court found that River Crossings failed to exercise due diligence and that it was this 
failure that ultimately resulted in the default judgment. 
[*P28] After reviewing River Crossings' arguments, the facts of the case, and the trial court's rulings, we cannot say 
the trial court exceeded the bounds of its discretion. River Crossings conceded to the trial court that "this is a close case." 
Because "a trial court has [such] broad discretion" on this issue, Lund v. Brown. 2000 UT 75. P 9. 11 P.3d 277, we will 
not reverse an admittedly, and demonstrably, "close case." We recognize that "w*?default judgments are generally 
disfavored, but "[i]n the absence of an abuse of discretion, we [will] not undertake to substitute our idea of what is 
proper for that of the trial court." G.M. Leasing Corp. v. Murray First Thrift & Loan Co.. 534 P.2d 1244. 1245 (Utah 1975;) 
(refusing to substitute judgment on trial court's issuance of sanctions). Although we might have reached a different 
conclusion in the first instance, we affirm the trial court's ruling that River Crossings did not show reasonable justification 
or excuse for its failure to answer. 
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III. The Trial Court's [***25] Findings of Fact 
[*P29] River Crossings' final contention is that the "district court's refusal to set aside [**48] the default judgment 
was based on faulty findings of fact." 
[*P30] River Crossings argues the trial court incorrectly found that, other than the June 29, 2006 letter, "[t]here were 
not any . . . discussions between [Arbogast]'s counsel and [River Crossings'] counsel between . . . June 29, 2006 and 
August 18, 2006." However, River Crossings acknowledges that "the district court's finding is perhaps technically 
correct." In fact, the record before us indicates the trial court's ruling was correct. There is nothing in the record 
demonstrating any communication from River Crossings' legal counsel to Arbogast's legal counsel during this time period. 
The only communication is the July 25 e-mail that was sent from River Crossings' managing member to Arbogast's 
principal. Thus, this finding of fact is not clearly erroneous. 1A 
} FOOTNOTES 
;• 14 Nor do we agree with River Crossings' argument that the trial court's finding is misleading. Not only is the trial \ 
court's finding correct, but it helps refute River Crossings' supposed belief that settlement discussions were ongoing. 
Ail of the previous settlement discussions [***26] had occurred through the parties' respective counsel. The fact 
that all communication between counsel stopped after the June 29, 2006 letter suggests that settlement efforts had 
ceased. 
[*P31] River Crossings further contests the trial court's finding that the June 29, 2006 letter informed River Crossings 
that Arbogast was requiring an answer within twenty days. River Crossings argues that because the letter actually stated 
that Arbogast "[is] hereby requesting . . . an Answer to the complaint within twenty (20) days," the trial court's ruling is 
clearly erroneous and the ruling must be reversed. We disagree. Regardless of the professional and civil tone of the June 
29 letter, its message was clear: Arbogast had rejected River Crossings' settlement offer and was moving forward with 
the litigation. Indeed, River Crossings acknowledged this plain implication during oral arguments. 15 Accordingly, the trial 
court's finding is not clearly erroneous. 
FOOTNOTES 
I is The following colloquy occurred during oral arguments in the trial court: ' • j 
\ ) 
[Counsel:] Our argument is that the June 29th, 2006 letter, while it said file an answer, I request that you 
I file an answer, there wasn't the s[word] of Damocles, if you don't, [***27] boom, you are done. . . . 
I [The Court]: Counsel, doesn't that somewhat imply that? . . . j 
[Counsel]: Well, the implication is there. ! 
IV. Attorney Fees 
[*P32] River Crossings does not appeal the trial court's grant of attorney fees to Arbogast, but argues that Arbogast is 
not entitled to attorney fees on appeal. Again, we disagree. 
[*P33] The trust deed note provided that "[i]f this note is collected by an attorney after default in the payment of 
principal or interest, either with or without suit, the undersigned . . . agree to pay all costs and expenses of collection 
including a reasonable attorney's fee." Moreover, the trial court's judgment awarded Arbogast its attorney fees below. 
See generally Valcarce v. Fitzgerald. 961 P.2d 305. 319 (Utah 1998^ (WW9?"[W]hen a party who received attorney fees 
below prevails on appeal, the party is also entitled to fees reasonably incurred on appeal." (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
[*P34] River Crossings* only argument against an award of attorney fees on appeal is that "this appeal does not 
directly relate to Arbogast's collection efforts." However, this case directly concerns Arbogast's collection efforts; 
Arbogast filed suit to collect the amount it claims it was owed [***28] under the parties' agreement. Because this case 
concerns Arbogast's collection efforts and because Arbogast was awarded its attorney fees below, we remand to the trial 
court for a determination of the reasonable attorney fees Arbogast incurred on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
[*P35] We affirm the trial court's denial of River Crossings' rule 60(b) motion to set aside the default judgment and 
remand for a determination of the attorney fees Arbogast incurred on appeal. 
Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge 
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Pamela T. Greenwood, 
Presiding Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
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